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11. Introduction
In West Africa as in other parts of the developing world, there has been a
push towards the privatization of state-owned enterprises in order to improve
productive e±ciency and promote competition. This drive towards privatiza-
tion has a®ected among others agricultural sectors such as cotton (in Benin,
but also in Mali and Burkina Faso), cocoa (in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana), and
groundnut (in Senegal). Many of these sectors used to follow the French-based
\¯liµ ere integr¶ ee" model, whereby a single parastatal ¯rm provided inputs to
farmers such as seeds and fertilizers at the beginning of the cropping season,
and then purchased the production of these farmers at the end of the season,
with the price paid to producers being net of the value of the inputs provided
earlier in the season (on the French ¯liµ ere integr¶ ee, see for example Raikes et
al., 2000).
One key rationale for this integrated model was the fact that credit markets
are weak in developing countries so that farmers cannot easily obtain credit
to purchase the inputs they need for their production1. By contrast, when
a single parastatal purchases all of the production of a given crop, there is
obviously an incentive for that parastatal to provide the inputs required by
farmers to produce the crop, as well as an ability for the prastatal to deduct
the price of the inputs from the payment made to farmers for their crop.
Despite some advantages of the integrated model, privatization was ad-
vocated in order to promote competition, increase e±ciency, and hopefully
generate higher prices for crop producers, as well as in order to reduce risks
of corruption related to the close links that used to exist in some countries
between some parastatals and political parties. In practice, privatization has
meant that at the input and output stages, multiple input providers as well as
crop purchasers have been allowed to enter previously closed makets.
The jury is still out in practice as to whether the move towards privatization
has been bene¯cial or not (e.g., Goreux, 2003; Badiane et al., 2002; Akiyama et
al., 2003; Poulton et al., 2003; Siaens and Wodon, 2008)2. It is not surprising
that empirical evidence is inconclusive as to the impact of privatization on
1There is a large literature on credit markets for farmers in developing countries. For
recent work on the issue of risk, see among others Boucher and Guirkinger (2007), and
Boucher et al. (2008).
2In the case of Zimbabwe which privatized its cotton sector earlier on, the impact of
competition has been mixed despite initial success, in part due to di±culties in coordinating
2farmers since theoretically as well, it is unclear whether privatization should
bene¯t farmers or not. In previous work (Makdissi and Wodon, 2005), we
compared the system of an integrated ¯rm supplying inputs and purchasing
crops to a privatized system with contract farming under which each farmer
negotiates its own contract, with the possibility of di®erent farmers paying
di®erent prices for their inputs and receiving di®erent prices for their crops.
Our model suggested that privatization could be bene¯cial to some farmers,
while being detrimental to others3.
In this paper, our objective is to suggest a di®erent theoretical argument
as to why privatization of input provision in agricultural sectors may actually
lead to a loss in e±ciency, rather than a gain. Our argument is based on the
di±culty to identify \good" from \bad" farmers in terms of their ability to pay
at the end of the cropping season for the inputs received at the beginning of
the season. In a privatized and decentralized system, new and younger farmers
who haven't yet proven their ability to pay the inputs that they receive at the
end of the season are more risky to deal with for input providers than farmers
who have already proven themselves and have a good \credit record".
If input provision markets were fully °exible, the prices paid by farmers for
their inputs or the quality of the inputs provided to them would adjust to fully
take into account the repayment risks and the limited information available to
input providers. But in the agricultural input markets in developing countries,
the prices to be paid for inputs can be subject to ceilings (negociated between
producer organizations, input providers and the state), and the inputs (such
as seeds) provided must respect minimal quality standards, so that costs for
input providers are subject to °oors. In such circumstances there may be
cases under which the decentralized provision of agricultural inputs by private
providers will not be e±cient. This is because the production of information
the actions of the various actors and maintaining quality standards (e.g., Gibbon, 1999;
Larsen, 2002 and 2003).
3On the input side, whether a farmer will bene¯t or not from privatization depends on
the farmer's elasticity of demand for inputs and the number of input providers. Similarly,
on the output side, the farmer's elasticity of supply of cotton and the number of cotton
purchasers will determine whether the farmer will bene¯t from privatization. Farmers with
a low elasticity of demand for inputs and a low elasticity supply of outputs are more likely
to be hurt by privatization than farmers with higher elasticities. More generally, on the
experience with contract farming in Africa, see Porter and Phillips-Howard (1997). For a
survey on the potential gains and losses from agricultural concentration, see Whitley (2003).
3on the quality of the farmers in terms of their ability or willingness to pay
for inputs (i.e., who pays and who does not pay the inputs at the end of the
cropping season, when farmers actually have resources to pay) is a public good
that will not be fully taken into account by private input providers in their
own optimization function4.
The model presented in this paper shows that input providers may pro-
duce or make available inputs at a level at which the cost of producing and
distributing new inputs will be below the expected bene¯t to them from sell-
ing these inputs. By contrast, a coordinating agency might better take the
public good nature of the information on the quality of farmers in terms of
their repayment ability into account, and this would result in a higher level
of production of inputs which will bene¯t farmers, as well as in higher pro¯ts
for input providers. In the absence of such a coordinating agency, production
or other subsidies for input providers could make sense on e±ciency grounds
apart from the more traditional equity arguments advanced sometimes in the
literature given the bene¯ts of higher availability of inputs for farmers. In
other words, equity considerations would not be the only argument in favor of
government subsidies or intervention in the agricultural input provision mar-
ket.
2. Model and Results
Consider input providers who maximize their actualized expected VNM (Von
4A similar point was made by Makdissi and Tejedo (2004) in the case of labor markets.
Indeed, the argument made in this paper is similar to an argument made in the employment
literature which points out to the fact that there is a cost for ¯rms to match their needs with
the workers that they are hiring (Jovanovic, 1979; Miller, 1984). This matching process
is imperfect as ¯rms do not have full information on the future level of productivity of
the workers that they are hiring. This leads many ¯rms to hire workers, and then ¯re
some of them (those who proved less productive) in order to hire new workers who may
not appear very di®erent on the basis of their observable characteristics from the workers
who just lost their job. As noted by McCall (1991), the issue of matching workers with
jobs is more problematic for younger workers who lack experience and have not yet proven
themselves. For more experienced workers, their past successful record of employment is a
signal that ¯rms can use in order to minimize the risks associated with hiring new workers.
Note that this signal on individual worker quality is available to all ¯rms, not only to those
that employed these more successful workers, since on the labor market workers make their
employment record public.
4Neuman-Morgenstern) utility of income over an in¯nite time horizon5. A
slightly simpler model could be written in a two-period framework, but for
the sake of generality, we will use an in¯nite horizon. The input providers
derive their income from providing farm inputs to small scale farmers at the
beginning of the cropping season, with payment at the end of that season.
The market is regulated so that there is a maximum price or fee that can
be charged to farmers for those inputs, which is denoted by f. Assume that
each farmer uses only one unit of input and that those inputs are produced
by a constant return to scale production function. In this context, the cost
for producing the inputs for n farmers is given by c ¢ n. The input providers





new farmers (i.e. farmers who are receing inputs for the ¯rst time) pay for
the inputs at the end of the cropping season. This proportion p is unknown





, then its expected value is ¹ =
R 1
p pdF (p). We also assume that
pf > c, otherwise the market for inputs may vanish.
The input providers are risk averse, so that their preferences may be rep-
resented by a Bernoulli utility function u(¢) with standard assumptions u0 ¸ 0
and u00 (¢) · 0. The hypothesis of risk aversion is necessary in order for the
input providers to prefer to have more information on the quality (in terms of
payment for the inputs) of the farmers and thereby reduce the risk of providing
inputs to farmers which would turn out not to pay for these inputs at the end
of the cropping season.
Farmers live (and thereby receive inputs) for two periods. In the ¯rst
period, they obtain inputs for the ¯rst time, so that input providers do not have
any speci¯c information on the probability that they will pay for the inputs
received at the end of the cropping season. In the second period however,
the farmers have the equivalent of a credit rating record, so that any input
provider will know if they have been good at paying their inputs or not in the
previous period (the fact that there is a credit rating system means that the
information on the quality of the farmers is available to all input providers,
not only to the provider who sold inputs in the ¯rst period to any particular
5Assume for example that at time t = 0, the input provider is a dynasty head who cares
for the welfare of his o®spring. In this context, the discount factor ¯ incorporates time
preference as well as altruism.
5farmer). At any given time t, an input provider will sell inputs to both new
(¯rst period) and old (second period) farmers.
The number of input providers is K > 1. As already mentioned, the
input providers cannot identify the quality of new, ¯rst period farmers. New
farmers are therefore chosen randomly. After one period, \bad" farmers lose
the ability to purchase input since they did not pay for these inputs in the
previous period, while the identity of \good" farmers is common knowledge
through the equivalent of the credit rating system. Let ni
t be the number of
new farmers chosen by input provider i at time t and let ´i
t be the number of
good farmers among them. If the number of input providers is large, we can











At the end of each period, good farmers are equally distributed among each
input provider. We will assume that the fee paid for the inputs by good farm-
ers is at the maximum admissible value f. We could also assume that input
providers wishing to keep good farmers will o®er a reduction in fees in the sec-
ond period, but this would not change the key results. What matters is that at
the equilibrium, each input provider will ask for the same fee and good farmers
will be distributed equally among all input providers. Speci¯cally, each input




Assume now that there exist ´¡1 good farmers at time 0. For input
























where Eui represents the input provider's expected utility and ¯ is the discount



































6Consider now the open loop Nash equilibrium of this problem. The steady-







¤f [¹ + p] ¡ c ¢ (b n















¤f [¹ + p] ¡ c ¢ (b n
¤ [1 + ¹])
¢
dF (p) (4)
The interpretation of (4) is that input providers equalize the expected















An alternative to the decentralized functioning of the market would be to
have some agency intervening in order to maximize the joint expected utility
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By comparing (4) and (6), we can see that individual input providers only







p u0 (¢)dF (p), while the coordinating agency





p u0 (¢)dF (p). We can now state a ¯rst result.
7Lemma 1 If the input providers cannot identify the quality of new farmers,
the decentralized allocation does not maximize joint pro¯ts.
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Y = 0 (9)
and
X + ¯¹Y = 0: (10)




This implies that K must be equal to 1, which is a contradiction since we have
more than one input providers, hence b n¤ 6= e n¤
What happens if we do not assume that input providers charge the same
price to new farmers and good farmers? At the steady state equilibrium, an
equilibrium price f¤ which depends on the elasticity of supply and demand of
inputs will emerge. All input providers will charge f¤ and good farmers will
be indi®erent between input providers. This implies that good farmers will
be equally distributed among each input providers. A consequence of this will
be that an input provider who chooses a new farmer at time t will produce
information that is valuable to competing providers. At the Nash equilibrium,
providers do not internalize this external bene¯t. This implies that the number
of farmers chosen remains ine±cient.
Note that if the number of farmers at the Nash equilibrium does not maxi-
mize joint ¯rm pro¯ts, this does not imply that it does not maximizes welfare.
The lemma simply states that the number of farmers is not optimal from the
8point of view of the coordinating agency. However, if this non-optimality from
the point of view of coordinating agency leads to a lower number of farmers,
then we can state that the equilibrium provides a lower level of welfare than
would be feasible under a di®erent arrangement, so that a Pareto improvement
is possible. The next proposition analyzes what happens in the speci¯c case
when we move toward a perfectly competitive market for input provision.
Proposition 1 In a perfect competition framework (K ! 1), the number of
new farmers is lower than under central coordination of input provision.
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dF (p) = 0 (12)
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dF (p) = 0: (13)
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dF (p) < 0: (14)
Given that it is impossible to have jointly equations(13) and (14), e n¤ cannot
be strictly lower than b n¤. From Lemma 1, we know that e n¤ cannot be equal
to b n¤. This implies that e n¤ > b n¤.
This situation is somewhat similar in spirit to Hardin's (1968) \tragedy of
the commons" for renewable natural resources for which there is free access.
Here, the common resource is the pool of identi¯ed good farmers to which
all input providers have free (or quasi free) access. In the case of natural re-
sources, the situation leads to over-extraction of the resources, while in our
9case, there is under-production of the common resource represented by the
information on good farmers. If the demand for inputs on the part of farmers
is inelastic (everybody needs inputs in order to be able to produce their crops),
the decentralized provision by risk averse input providers does not maximize
social welfare. Said di®erently, if the output price is determined on interna-
tional markets, a coordinating agency would not only enable input providers
to maximize their pro¯t, but it would also increase social welfare by increasing
consumer surplus of farmers who use these inputs.
3. Conclusion
Many developing countries have privatized their integrated agricultural pro-
duction systems with the hope that this would increase e±ciency in the pro-
duction of export crops such as cotton, cocoa, co®ee and groundnut. We have
shown in this paper that privatization may lead to ine±ciency instead under
the (realistic) assumption that risk is involved in the provision of inputs to
farmers at the beginning of a cropping season, as some farmers may not be
able or willing to pay for their inputs at the end of the season when they sell
their outputs. More precisely, we have outlined a simple model under which
the provision of inputs by risk averse private input providers is ine±cient, as
the marginal bene¯t from providing additional inputs to the market would
more than compensate for the cost of making these additional inputs available
to farmers.
A coordinating agency which would take into account the information gen-
erated by farmers on their ability to pay for their inputs at the end of the
cropping season would help to produce more inputs, and it would do so in a
pro¯table way. In the absence of such a coordinating agency, the information
generated in the ¯rst period on the quality of the new farmers is a public
good which is not fully taken into account in the maximization behavior of
decentralized input providers.
It should be emphasized that the lack of e±ciency arises in large part
because both the fees or prices to be paid for the inputs by farmers and the
quality of the inputs to be provided to them are regulated in the model. If we
assume that farmers have an inelastic demand for inputs (all farmers need the
inputs to produce their crops and this production is key to their livelihood),
prices would adjust upward to clear the market if there were no ceiling on
the maximum admissible fees or prices for the inputs. Alternatively, the
10production cost of the inputs could adjust downward (through lower quality)
in order to clear the market at the fee ceiling. Yet in the farm input market
in developing countries for crops such as cotton, co®ee, cocoa, or groundnut,
we do typically have both price or fee ceilings for inputs and quality °oors, so
that the markets may indeed not clear as they are supposed to.
The results of our model should not be interpreted as suggesting that pri-
vatization should not be implemented in agricultural sectors in sub-Saharan
Africa and elsewhere as there may be good reasons for pursuing the privatiza-
tion agenda which have nothing to do with the issue discussed here. Instead,
the potential implication of our model is that in the absence of a coordinat-
ing agency (or if creating such an agency is not feasible), governments willing
to minimize the proportion of farmers without adequate inputs could on the-
oretical grounds implement policies such as production subsidies for input
providers, public production of selected inputs, or subsidies for example in
the form of payment guarantees for the inputs received by farmers in order to
achieve full e±ciency in the functioning of the farm input market.
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